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A Global Collection 
Reviewing The Global Limits of Competition Law 
(Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2012) 
 
Max Huffman† 
The Global Limits of Competition Law is the first install-
ment in Daniel Sokol’s and Ioannis Lianos’s ambitious new se-
ries from Stanford University Press, Global Competition Law 
and Economics.1 The project is ambitious because it takes on a 
potentially unbounded topic, and one that is constantly chang-
ing. It is also ambitious because Sokol and Lianos enter a satu-
rated market. This first volume is sufficiently captivating, and 
represents such an extraordinary breadth of national and re-
gional perspectives, that the authors appear to have fulfilled 
their ambitions. 
Sokol and Lianos need no introduction to a follower of re-
cent antitrust scholarship. Through their own scholarly 
achievements and extensive world-wide connections in the an-
titrust bar, bench, and academy, they are well—perhaps 
uniquely—positioned to bring together a collection of this sort. 
Sokol has published vigorously on a range of antitrust topics, 
employing comparative, international, and institutionalist per-
spectives to a degree that few, if any, in the U.S. academy can 
claim.2 The Paul Caron of antitrust, he has a huge popular fol-
 
†  Associate Professor and Dean’s Fellow, IU Robert H. McKinney School 
of Law. Mark Anderson provided helpful insights. Eleanor Frisch of Headnotes 
provided tremendous editorial input. Copyright © 2013 by Max Huffman. 
 1. THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW (Ioannis Lianos & D. Dan-
iel Sokol, eds., 2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL LIMITS].  
 2. See, e.g., COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (Eleanor 
M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009); D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of Interna-
tional Antitrust and Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1081 (2009); D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional 
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY 
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 37 (2007).  
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lowing through his work on the Antitrust & Competition Policy 
Blog.3 Early in his career, Sokol has achieved the enviable posi-
tion of setting the terms of the scholarly dialogue. Sokol’s work 
on the “antitrust law prof blog” deserves special mention in the 
light of this global collection. I am not being hyperbolic in pro-
posing that one of the top few, if not the single, greatest contri-
butions to antitrust thought in recent years has been the daily 
exposure of lawyers, judges, policy-makers, and scholars to 
work in competition policy being done around the globe.  
Lianos is a leader in the study of global competition law 
and economics. He has written and edited several books and 
dozens of articles and book chapters, usually employing a com-
parative perspective. Lianos is well situated to bring off a mul-
ti-volume study of global competition law and economics. A 
lawyer and social scientist himself, he has published papers in 
at least three languages. He has taught in Britain, France, and 
the U.S., and he has worked with competition law enforcement 
agencies in both Europe and the U.S.  
In The Global Limits of Competition Law, Lianos and Sokol 
appear to have followed a tried-and-true approach to producing 
a top-quality collaborative publication. They brought together 
an extraordinary cast of contributors, from leaders of the U.S. 
antitrust academy to noted economists, lawyers, and professors 
spanning four continents.4 Then, it appears they got out of the 
way and let their contributors do what they do best. Their ap-
proach produced a marvelous diversity of topics and points of 
view. The book juxtaposes George Priest’s study of the origin 
and influence of the Chicago School of Antitrust5 with Arianna 
Andreangeli’s study of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ relevance for competition law enforcement.6 Sokol 
writes about the competition policy implications of government 
regulation.7 Jeffrey Harrison discusses surprising complica-
 
 3. D. Daniel Sokol, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/. Professor Paul Caron is 
the Editor-in-Chief of Law Professor Blogs LLC. LAW PROFESSORS BLOGS, 
http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com. 
 4. See GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at xi–xiv. 
 5. George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tra-
dition, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at 15. 
 6. Arianna Andreangeli, Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a 
Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory Intervention, in GLOBAL 
LIMITS, supra note 1, at 22. 
 7. D. Daniel Sokol, Anticompetitive Government Regulation, in GLOBAL 
LIMITS, supra note 1, at 83. 
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tions of the treatment of monopsony in U.S. law.8 Lianos im-
ports lessons from Easterbrook’s The Limits of Antitrust9 to in-
form the difficult question of remedying antitrust violations.10 
And it goes on. 
I.  THE LIMITS BRAND   
Lianos and Sokol’s approach is not without drawbacks. Li-
anos and Sokol make a heroic effort in the book to weave to-
gether a collection of fundamentally disparate scholarly 
works.11 They confess their challenge up front; any effort to 
draw out Easterbrook’s seminal 1984 article to the global con-
text necessarily will be frustrated by the article’s ultimately 
narrow reach. The Limits of Antitrust is about intrinsic limits 
on U.S.-style antitrust enforcement.12 Easterbrook’s argument 
is fundamentally institutionalist rather than substantive in na-
ture. He did not write with an eye to other enforcement sys-
tems with different procedures and different goals. It is unclear 
to what degree, for example, Easterbrook’s concern with false 
positives in enforcement would apply in a jurisdiction without a 
private remedy, without punitive treble damages recovery, 
without the common law’s stasis, and with technocrats at the 
center of the enforcement program—in short, a jurisdiction in 
which error is less likely and less costly.  
Mr. Tapia and Mr. Montt’s contribution, Judicial Scrutiny 
and Competition Authorities: The Institutional Limits of Anti-
trust,13 recognizes this reality: “Easterbrook’s insights on the 
‘judicial’ limits of antitrust crucially depend on the specific inst-
itutional design and the incentives it creates.”14 They note that 
the prosecutorial system with decision-making by (and appeals 
to) generalist courts, which describes both private and Depart-
ment of Justice enforcement in the United States, may be “idio-
 
 8. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Complications in the Antitrust Response to Mo-
nopsony, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at 54. 
 9. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 
(1984). 
 10. Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law Remedies: In Search of a Theory, in 
GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at 177. 
 11. See Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, Introduction, in GLOBAL LIM-
ITS, supra note 1, at 1. 
 12. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 4. 
 13. See Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny & Competition 
Authorities: The Institutional Limits of Antitrust, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra 
note 1, at 141. 
 14. Id. 
  
10 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [98:7 
 
syncratic to the legal, institutional, and historical realities of 
the . . . United States.”15 Tapia and Montt conclude that 
“[p]olitical, legal and economic, and cultural idiosyncratic fac-
tors are too relevant to provide general answers” about institu-
tional limits.16 
There is even the question of whether a limit must be insti-
tutional in nature. Easterbrook’s limit of antitrust was a com-
bination of mostly institutional features that Easterbrook con-
tends renders antitrust unable to produce defensible results 
outside a narrowly drawn sphere.17 Professor Andreangeli’s 
contribution, Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a 
Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory Interven-
tion, raises an institutional concern that may be unique to the 
EU experience, although the due process concerns with a 
“[c]ommission [that] acts as investigator, prosecutor, and judge 
in the cases it deals with” and that renders “decisions [that] are 
subject to only limited review”18 have been raised with regard 
to the Federal Trade Commission as well.19 Tapia and Montt 
follow the institutional limits approach, as do other contribu-
tors to Global Limits—including Lianos, whose chapter on 
remedies is examined more closely below. Other authors (not 
contributing to this collection) employing the limits branding 
define it similarly.20  
One might propose a broader definition of limits that rec-
ognizes social goals that competition policy cannot achieve re-
gardless of institutional structure. This broader definition of 
limits is at the core of the tension between regulation and anti-
trust.21 Regulation may seek to achieve goals like the public in-
 
 15. Id. at 148. 
 16. Id. at 156. 
 17. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1–4, 14–15, 39–40.  
 18. Andreangeli, supra note 6, at 23. 
 19. See Mark Leddy et al., Transatlantic Merger Control: The Courts and 
the Agencies, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25, 51–52 (2010). 
 20. See, e.g., Goeffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Lim-
its of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 177–78, 189–244 (2011) (relying on Easterbrook’s error-
cost framework to argue that uncertainty favors lesser enforcement); Philip J. 
Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft, & Beyond, 
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 272 (2009) (limits of antitrust include institutional 
limits on the ability to deal with rapidly changing technology industries). 
 21. This limit of competition policy is also implicated by constitutional 
questions under, for example, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (First Amend-
ment Petition Clause immunity) and the Parker v. Brown doctrine (state-
action immunity based on federalism). See generally, United Mine Workers of 
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terest22 or maximal estate value.23 Regulation’s diverse goals 
may be broader than those of competition policy, which (in the 
United States) are frequently stated to be economic efficiency 
in service of consumers,24 or even more succinctly, keeping 
prices low.25 Regulation’s goals may also be narrower than 
those of competition policy, which extend to the entire economy 
rather than to the sector under the regulator’s jurisdiction (or 
the estate under the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction).26 Under 
this approach, the limit of competition policy is where the social 
policy goal deviates from, or is even antithetical to, the goals of 
competition policy.27  
  
 
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 
63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943). 
 22. In the case of FCC and FAA regulation. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE MER-
GER REVIEW PROCESS 286–88 (3d ed. 2006); see also, e.g., 47 U.S.C. 309(a), (d), 
310(d) (FCC); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STAFF ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS, 
AT&T/T-Mobile Merger, No. 11-65, at 3 (2011) (competitive concerns under-
mine public interest requirement); cf. 49 U.S.C. 41105 (requiring DOT approv-
al for transfer of air carrier certificates); 14 C.F.R. pt. 135, FAA Order No. 
8900.1 ¶¶ 3-3591–3-3596 (describing changes that follow from airline mergers 
which require FAA approval). See generally Howard Shelanski, Justice Breyer, 
Professor Kahn, and Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Industries, 100 CAL. 
L. REV. 487, 505–06 (2012) (noting conflict between the FCC’s broader public 
interest standard and antitrust’s competition goals). 
 23. In the case of bankruptcy courts. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, 
Nonbankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 
857 (1982) ("[M]ost of the bankruptcy process is in fact concerned with credi-
tor-distribution questions."). See generally Max Huffman, Worlds in Collision: 
Merger Policy in Bankruptcy (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor) (contrasting efficiency and consumer protection goals of antitrust with 
the estate-value-maximization goals of bankruptcy reorganization). 
 24. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (2d ed. 1993); Max 
Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and 
Consumer Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 7 (2010); Paolisa Nebbia, 
Competition Law and Consumer Protection Against Unfair Commercial Prac-
tices: A More-than-Complementary Relationship?, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra 
note 1, at 127.  
 25. See Wallace v. IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 26. Whether the “entire economy” means the global economy, a national 
economy, or something in between (e.g., a free trade zone or fiscal union) 
might be the subject of much debate. The rule for U.S. antitrust appears to be 
that antitrust’s efficiency goals serve the U.S. economy only. See F. Hoffman-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating that U.S. 
antitrust laws may be applied to foreign conduct to redress domestic antitrust 
injury). 
 27. This definition may beg as many questions as it answers: for example, 
to what degree a particular social policy like universal service in telephony or 
air transport deviates from efficiency and consumer-protection goals. 
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The regulation-competition interface underlies Sokol’s con-
tribution, Anticompetitive Government Regulation.28 Rather 
than merely seeing the regulation-competition interface as an-
other possible limit, Sokol asserts that “the real limit of anti-
trust is that antitrust enforcement (particularly public en-
forcement) may not reach the type of conduct that is most 
harmful to economic development—anticompetitive govern-
ment regulation.”29 Sokol draws on his scholarly work in the 
field of competition advocacy as a solution to regulation that 
champions another policy over the narrow efficiency goals of 
antitrust.30 
Under this second understanding of limits—antitrust’s 
goals’ being subordinated to other social policies—it would be 
difficult or impossible to articulate a global limit, even a set of 
global limits, on competition policy. The limit will always be 
where some other social policy goal overcomes those goals that 
competition policy advances. That can be a substantive ques-
tion in the case of a particular regime that narrowly defines the 
goals of competition policy.31 It can be an institutional question 
in the more difficult case of a regime that, like the United 
States, leaves the goals of antitrust open to interpretation and 
common-law development.  
This latter approach will draw limits broadly where the in-
stitutions in place are capable of applying the law, and narrow-
ly where they are not. The substantive and institutional limits 
themselves can be in tension. A substantive prohibition of price 
discrimination explicitly written into the antitrust laws in the 
United States and elsewhere reflects an extension of antitrust 
into the consumer-protection realm. That prohibition violates 
some commentators’ sense of drawing limits narrowly based on 
institutional considerations, because price discrimination may 
be efficient and its prohibition inefficient,32 and because some 
do not trust our institutions to discern which is which. 
 
 28. Sokol, Anticompetitive Government Regulation, supra note 7, at 83. 
 29. Id. at 83–84. 
 30. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Inter-
ventions that Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119 (2009). 
 31. This demonstrates the profound effect of defining the goals of anti-
trust narrowly to be only low prices in service of consumer interests. Antitrust 
enforcement will be curtailed any time the goals to be achieved do not include 
low prices.  
 32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 27 (2d ed. 2001). Posner sees 
this as one of “two principal exceptions” to “the natural, the feasible, and the 
legitimate” economic guide to interpreting the U.S. antitrust laws. Id. 
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All this shows that there is no content to the idea of limits 
on competition policy. Defining limits becomes a Rorschach test 
for a commentator’s views on the value of competition policy 
generally. Charged with writing about global limits, Lianos and 
Sokol’s contributors gamely do so, but frequently in terms that 
are unrelated to Easterbrook’s thesis. I found myself applaud-
ing that result. After a glut of scholarly work borrowing the 
limits brand that arose around the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Easterbrook’s work, it was refreshing to read about limits writ 
large, rather than the narrowly defined intrinsic failings of U.S. 
antitrust as it was enforced in the 1970s. And Lianos and Sokol 
structure this volume “start[ing] with the traditional limits im-
posed by the antitrust law process”—what I have called institu-
tional or intrinsic limits—”before addressing other, broader 
limits of competition law relating to competition economics, 
synergies with other areas of law, institutional design, and cul-
ture.”33 
II.  SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS   
This review is concentrated on several of the chapters, se-
lected partly at random, partly based on my interest in a par-
ticular author’s work, and partly based on my interest in a par-
ticular topic. These chosen chapters are not necessarily 
representative: this is an incredibly broad and varied volume 
with contributions from around the world.  
A. PROFESSOR PRIEST 
George Priest may be uniquely positioned to teach about 
the history and meaning of the Chicago School of Antitrust, 
having been present for its early development but not frequent-
ly identified with the movement himself. His chapter, The Lim-
its of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, teaches that 
the Chicago School has its roots in early volumes of the Journal 
of Law & Economics and Friedrich Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Socie-
ty. The society “was, and to some extent still is, dedicated to the 
proposition that political interference with market activities is 
harmful to freedom—though the society avoided a purely liber-
tarian approach.”34 That same minimalist program underlay 
Chicago School antitrust, which was “skeptical of governmental 
and judicial interference” but “never advocated abandoning an-
 
 33. See Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 1–2. 
 34. Priest, supra note 5, at 15. 
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titrust law in the Armentano libertarian way. The Chicago 
School tradition sought to constrain antitrust law—chiefly by 
ridiculing its excesses—but accepted antitrust enforcement as 
an underlying background condition of market activity.”35 
Lianos and Sokol introduce Priest’s contribution as “histor-
ical context for Easterbrook’s writing.”36 History would be 
enough, but Priest’s chapter is much more. He describes the 
“often unappreciated,” “political dimension” of the Coase theo-
rem37 and its relevance to Chicago School antitrust.38 Priest 
conceptualizes the Coase theorem as supporting a non-
interference role for the government in markets. Government 
support should be limited to reducing transaction costs, which 
would enhance welfare.39 That is a precursor to the view, fun-
damental to Easterbrook’s error-cost analysis in The Limits of 
Antitrust, that “courts will make erroneous judgments.”40 Priest 
sees Easterbrook’s error-cost analysis as a refinement of Chica-
go School antitrust, making the critique useful rather than 
merely hostile. In contrast with Robert Bork’s “sarcastic tone, 
largely dismissive of the ability of . . . courts to understand in-
dustrial organization,” Easterbrook “addresses, as science, the 
implications of inevitable judicial error for the fashioning of ef-
fective antitrust rules.”41 Priest does not draw the comparison 
in this chapter, but the preference for the Easterbrook ap-
proach over the Bork approach harkens to recent discussions of 
a “Neo-Chicago School,” which seeks to improve antitrust rules 
in light of error-cost analysis and empirical research.42 
Priest does not plow much new ground, and his contribu-
tion is limited to the U.S. antitrust experience. Because under-
standing the history of antitrust law and economics is helpful 
to its further development, because the U.S. experience with 
antitrust law and economics offers a lesson for global competi-
tion policy, and because Easterbrook’s article has made an out-
size contribution to the subsequent common-law development 
in U.S. antitrust, Priest’s chapter is as important as it is inter-
 
 35. Id. at 19. 
 36. Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 2. 
 37. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & 
Econ. 1 (1960). 
 38. See Priest, supra note 5, at 17. 
 39. Id. at 17. 
 40. Id. at 20. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 
78 Antitrust L.J. 105 (2012) (citing sources). 
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esting. It is also well positioned in this volume, introducing the 
limits thesis as originally conceived before that thesis is broad-
ened and reconceptualized throughout the rest of the collection. 
B. PROFESSOR HARRISON 
Jeffrey Harrison writes about our limited understanding of 
the economics of buyer power—”monopsony”—and its implica-
tions for U.S. antitrust law.43 Harrison does not discuss the sort 
of intrinsic limit to our antitrust system that Easterbrook ad-
dressed—the institutional competence of U.S. enforcers and de-
cision-makers to interpret the law properly to accommodate the 
economics of monopsony. Instead, this chapter is about the 
common law’s failure to date to accommodate the nuances of 
buy-side relationships, having been developed in the context of 
sell-side relationships.44 Harrison’s chapter is also about U.S. 
antitrust, rather than global competition law, although of 
course economic lessons for competition policy are not subject to 
import duties. Lianos and Sokol explain that this chapter 
speaks to “the complexity of integrating economic concepts in 
legal outputs.”45  
Harrison teaches that economic theory “generally supports 
the idea of comparable treatment” of monopoly and monopso-
ny.46 (He later goes further: “[m]onopsony is the mirror image 
of monopoly.”)47 That has always been my understanding. Cas-
es involving employer and other buyer cartels follow rules that 
are difficult to distinguish from those involving producer car-
tels.48 I lecture to my students that it does not matter whether 
we view the Overlap Group case,49 which dealt with non-
compete agreements among schools in scholarships for particu-
larly attractive students, as an example of a joint exercise of 
buyer power (with the students as assets in the educational 
 
 43. Harrison, supra note 8. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 4. 
 46. Harrison, supra note 8, at 55. 
 47. Id. at 65. 
 48. Compare Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If the 
plaintiff in this case could allege that defendants actually formed an agree-
ment to fix MPT salaries, this per se rule would likely apply.”) with Omnicare, 
Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., 629 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (alleged buyer 
cartel in health insurance industry) and White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 
571 (1st Cir. 2011) (alleged seller cartel involving retail gas stations). 
 49. See United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Mark Anderson deserves credit for my understanding of this authority. 
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process) or as an example of a joint exercise of seller power 
(with students as consumers). 
But it is not always so. Harrison goes on to discuss several 
areas, including territorial divisions, tying, and group boycotts, 
in which monopsony power complicates an analysis crafted for 
monopoly power. It is tempting to attribute these complications 
to the one-sided nature of antitrust’s goals—protecting con-
sumers but not necessarily investors—but that simplistic char-
acterization misses the complexity of Harrison’s argument. He 
notes that sell-side territorial divisions have pro-competitive 
justifications, such as the free-rider concern the dissent dis-
cussed in United States v. Topco Associates, while buy-side ter-
ritorial divisions do not. 50 A fuller understanding of both hori-
zontal territorial divisions and monopsony might preserve the 
per se rule for buy-side territorial divisions while moving to a 
rule of reason approach for sell-side territorial divisions.51  
It is not clear that deviations in the law from the economic 
understanding regarding the symmetry of monopoly and mo-
nopsony reflect an example of a global limit of competition poli-
cy. The law of territorial divisions, tying, and group boycotts is 
murky in general.52 The limit that Harrison identifies exists 
whenever any body of law is in a state of flux. I do not come 
away from this chapter with a deeper appreciation of an intrin-
sic limit on competition policy in global economic governance. 
But that does not undermine my appreciation for Harrison’s 
contribution. Like Priest’s chapter, this one will inform my fu-
ture research and teaching, and I imagine it would be of sub-
stantial use to an advocate, judge, or policy-maker seeking to 
understand better the competitive consequences of a particular 
observed practice. 
 
 50. Harrison, supra note 8, at 64 (citing United States v. Topco Associ-
ates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972)). 
 51. Id. at 65. 
 52. Id. at 63. See also Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law 
of Product Tying, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 521, 522 (2007) (“The law governing tying 
arrangements is now a focal point of tension between the two major antitrust 
philosophies.”); M. Todd Carroll, Note, No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl 
Championship Series Stays In-Bounds of the Sherman Act, 61 WASH. LEE L. 
REV. 1235, 1266–68 (2004) (describing the progression from per se treatment 
of group boycotts to rule of reason, except in the case of “classic boycotts”); Eri-
ca N. Andersen, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate Over Reverse-
Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 
and In re Tamofixen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1042 (2008) 
(noting one instance in which per se treatment of horizontal market divisions 
gives way). 
  
2013] A GLOBAL COLLECTION 17 
 
C. PROFESSOR NEBBIA 
Paolisa Nebbia’s contribution, Competition Law and Con-
sumer Protection Against Unfair Commercial Practices, was one 
I picked for its subject matter. The intersection of competition 
law and consumer protection has become a global hot topic in 
recent years; Lianos and Sokol observe that it is “a natural area 
of overlap in competition and regulation.”53 Many regulatory 
agencies world-wide combine the functions, whether in the in-
terest of cost savings or as a matter of best practices.54  
Some regulation and theories of enforcement are not easily 
categorized as either competition law or consumer protection. 
For example, the Federal Trade Commission has prohibited 
“fraudulent or deceptive conduct that could harm wholesale pe-
troleum markets,” a prohibition that has both consumer protec-
tion (fraud and deceit) and competition (wholesale markets) 
facets.55 EU law, the law of South Africa, and some developing 
competition regimes have recognized monopoly exploitation—
which in the U.S. presents consumer protection concerns in 
some narrow instances under state price-gouging legislation—
as a competition concern.56 (Evidence of frequent enforcement 
of exploitation prohibitions is not strong.57)  
Scholars recently have studied the intersection of competi-
tion law and consumer protection from a few perspectives. One 
approach is to view competition policy from a consumer per-
spective.58 Another is to study the competition policy concerns 
 
 53. Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 6. 
 54. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Competition and Consumer Protection Au-
thorities Worldwide, http://www.ftc.gov/oia/authorities.shtm (last visited Aug. 
28, 2013). Nebbia is well suited to make a contribution on this topic, working 
in the Italian competition authority. Italy’s enforcement agency is another 
that combines the consumer protection and competition functions. See 
AUTORITÀ GARANTE DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEL MERCATO, 
http://www.agcm.it/en (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 55. Prohibitions of Energy Market Manipulation Rule, 16 C.F.R pt. 
317(2013). 
 56. Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Ex-
clusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, ¶ 23, COM (2009) (EU law); 
see Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, (EU Law); 
Harmony Gold Mining v. Mittal Steel S. Afr. Ltd., Case No. 13/CR (Feb. 2004). 
See generally Gregory B. Adams, European and American Antitrust Regulation 
of Pricing by Monopolists, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1985).  
 57. See David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and 
Exercise of Monopoly Power and its Implications for Antitrust, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2008, at 203. 
 58. See Robert H. Lande, Revitalizing Section 5 of the FTC Act Using 
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of what are classically consumer protection violations.59 
Nebbia’s chapter is an excellent contribution to this developing 
body of scholarship. She notes the differences between competi-
tion law and consumer protection in terms of the types of 
claims each encompass as well as the directness of their opera-
tion: competition law protects consumers indirectly by ensuring 
properly functioning markets, while consumer protection pro-
tects consumers directly by attacking individual transactions.60 
But Nebbia suggests the complementary nature of the bodies of 
law outweighs the differences. Competition law enables the 
forces of competition to preserve welfare, and consumer protec-
tion fills the gaps that are left when the forces of competition 
are insufficient to protect consumers.61  
In her description of the complementary nature of consum-
er protection and competition law, Nebbia recognizes the specif-
ic example of “market manipulation” through a process I have 
called “behavioral exploitation.”62 “Advertising, promotion, and 
price setting are commonly used, to varying degrees, to alter 
the process of formation of consumers’ preferences, which con-
stitutes the key assumption of competition law.”63 It is not clear 
why Nebbia treats this theory of harm as distinct from her pre-
vious category of harm arising in the context of “credence 
goods.” Behavioral exploitation represents a more nuanced ex-
planation of an information-economics-based theory of welfare 
loss from inadequate disclosures in markets characterized by 
disparities in sophistication between the seller and buyer.64  
Nebbia offers a potent example of the interplay between 
competition law and consumer protection, comparing a chal-
lenge brought by the Italian authority under EC Directive 
2005/29 of a “mass campaign” by former state monopoly tele-
phone provider Telecom of deceptive statements and omissions 
to prevent consumers’ migrating to competitors. The campaign 
“involved unfair practices carried out against a large number of 
 
“Consumer Choice” Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2009, at 1. 
 59. See generally Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Anti-
trust, supra note 42; Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition 
Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm’s Deception?, 63 SMU L. REV. 1069 (2010). 
 60. Nebbia, supra note 24, at 127–28. 
 61. Id. at 128. 
 62. Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, supra 
note 42, at 130. 
 63. Nebbia, supra note 24, at 129. 
 64. Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, supra 
note 42, at 135–41. 
  
2013] A GLOBAL COLLECTION 19 
 
migrating customers.”65 The effects “were not limited to the in-
dividual case,” but because of a lack of market dominance, Arti-
cle 102 of the EU Treaty did not apply.66 The same conduct had 
taken place in France, with effects on the development of com-
peting telephone service providers. In contrast with Telecom in 
the Italian case, France Telecom had market power making “it 
possible to resort to Article 102.”67  
Nebbia’s contribution speaks to the margins of the tradi-
tional views of competition law in a way that truly tests the 
substantive limits of that body of law. The intersection of com-
petition law and consumer protection has been explored more 
fully in Europe than in the United States, despite the FTC’s 
longstanding status as a dual-purpose agency, so perhaps 
Nebbia’s contribution is an informative read primarily for a 
U.S. lawyer or academic. In particular, policy-makers at an 
agency like the FTC might do well to study Nebbia’s arguments 
regarding overlap and gap-filling benefits of the two bodies of 
law. And this sort of study of the parameters of what competi-
tion law can accomplish is precisely what one hopes to find 
when opening a volume like Global Limits. 
D. PROFESSOR LIANOS 
Professor Lianos previously has studied the role of reme-
dies in competition law enforcement, including a forthcoming 
book on competition law remedies under EU law.68 His chapter 
in Global Limits, Competition Law Remedies: In Search of a 
Theory builds on Easterbrook’s recognition that the limits of 
competition law are a function of the enforcement of competi-
tion law. But Lianos recognizes the importance of remedies to 
enforcement.69 “It follows that the existence, or not, of appro-
priate competition law remedies might set limits to competition 
 
 65. Nebbia, supra note 24, at 131–32. 
 66. Id. at 132. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See generally IOANNIS LIANOS ET AL., COMPETITION LAW REMEDIES IN 
EUROPE (forthcoming May 2014); Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, A 
Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the E.U. Microsoft Cases, 2010 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 346 (2010).  
 69. Easterbrook and others writing in his wake frequently assume reme-
dies for a violation are fixed and certain. Under U.S. law, that assumption 
holds in private damages litigation (though the amount of damages may re-
main subject to judicial influence). The assumption fails when the remedy 
sought is injunctive relief or when settlement through consent decree or oth-
erwise is a possibility. 
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law intervention.”70 This chapter has the potential to offer the 
most direct response to the crucial question the volume’s title 
promises to address—where it is that competition policy ends 
and regulation begins. Philip Weiser has observed that behav-
ioral remedies—remedial first-order regulation by antitrust 
courts and enforcement agencies—are likely to be part of the 
future of competition policy, at least in technology industries.71 
Lianos raises the example of the Microsoft litigation in 
both the U.S. and the EU. In the U.S., the initial remedy or-
dered was both structural—breaking up the firm—as well as 
behavioral—taking steps to increase the number of licensees.72 
In the EU, the remedy was behavioral, with Microsoft ordered 
to unbundle its Media Player application from the Windows op-
erating system.73 Though Lianos recognizes the remedies in 
Microsoft were “relatively complex and far-reaching,” the case 
nonetheless represents an interesting choice from which to 
propose a theory of remedies for competition law generally. In 
terms of size, novelty, and political salience, at least, Microsoft 
may be sui generis. Problems or successes in remedying con-
sumer harm in those cases may say very little about competi-
tion policy generally.74 
Lianos’s purpose is to theorize a comprehensive approach 
to remedying competition law violations. Because no settled 
approach exists in any jurisdiction, Lianos takes the opportuni-
ty—which perhaps no other chapter author in Global Limits 
has—to propose a truly global approach. Lianos’s chapter is 
more deeply theoretical than the others I studied closely. Its in-
tended targets are either academics or policy-makers, more 
than advocates or judges. 
  CONCLUSION   
Lianos and Sokol offer a volume full of new and topical 
contributions from around the globe. It is difficult to define a 
single purpose for all of the chapters. Of those I studied closely, 
 
 70. Lianos, Competition Law Remedies, supra note 10, at 177–78. 
 71. See Weiser, supra note 20, at 277, 285, 293.  
 72. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D.D.C. 
2000), vacated, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The structural portion of the 
remedy was reversed. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 49 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 73. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-491. 
 74. But see Weiser, supra note 20, at 279–86 (discussing Microsoft as one 
example of what is likely to be a continuing trend of antitrust challenges in 
platform industries). 
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some introduce a particular jurisdiction’s approach that may be 
foreign to the reader; some take a historical approach; some 
concentrate on the U.S. experience with antitrust law and eco-
nomics, relying on the U.S.’s historical first-mover status to 
provide the global relevance; and some attack a facet of compe-
tition law enforcement that has not been comprehensively the-
orized in any jurisdiction, let alone globally. 
Thinking how I might use this volume in my work, I antic-
ipate a combination of expanding my knowledge in preparation 
for class lectures (using, for example, chapters by Professors 
Priest and Harrison), providing background on a topic on which 
I hope to continue to engage in research (Professor Nebbia’s 
chapter), and in some cases offering an utterly fresh theoretical 
look at competition law generally (Professor Lianos’s chapter). 
Other chapters I will read because of the topic, because I make 
a practice of following all of the writing by some of these au-
thors, or because I am unfamiliar with some of these authors’ 
work and would like to change that.  
I introduced this review by suggesting Lianos and Sokol 
may have overreached in seizing on the “limits” branding, but I 
conclude that if so, it does not matter. Whether the volume suc-
ceeds in extending Easterbrook’s thesis to global study of com-
petition law or merely offers a broad and fascinating collection 
of writing from an impressive gathering of authors, it serves an 
important purpose and is well worth studying closely. 
 
